Editor's Note

Abstract

Equality has been a recurring theme in political and philosophical discussions within constitutional democracies, particularly when discussing fundamental rights. Although equality is a recurring right in the first catalogs of fundamental rights, its content and effectiveness have changed over time. The right to equality, as a moral right, is based on the central idea that all human beings are similar in their abilities and importance, and therefore should have the same rights and opportunities. This very broad moral right has been embodied in positive law in a variety of provisions, which often establish a series of prohibited criteria that serve as reasons for distinguishing between people. Criteria such as sex, race, ethnicity, economic status, religious belief, origin, etc., are generally excluded as reasons for distinguishing between individuals or groups. Such prohibitions on discrimination can be found in almost all national, international, and supranational catalogs of fundamental rights. This has led to the study of equality rights generally focusing on justifying the presence or analogy of some of these criteria in specific cases. However, the right to equality is more complex than it may seem at first glance.